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QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL WITH PRIVATE-PUBLIC KEY
Eduin Esteban Hernandez Serna∗
A quantum cryptographic protocol based in public key cryptography combinations and private key
cryptography is presented. Unlike the BB84 protocol [1] and its many variants[2, 3], two quantum
channels are used. The present research does not make reconciliation mechanisms of information to
derive the key. A three related system of key distribution are described.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd; 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
In cryptography, the objective is to transmit informa-
tion between two parties (Alice, Bob) that restrict ac-
cess to an eavesdropper (Eve). In classical cryptography,
the information is encrypted by a key which is kept in
a secret or public way. The key is distributed among
Alice and Bob to decrypt the message. Distribution the
key remains a difficult issue. Quantum mechanics pro-
vides solutions with protocols that are largely determined
by the following phases: preparation (Alice), measure-
ment (Bob), verification and key derive (Alice and Bob).
The last phase made public some details of the phases
of preparation or measuring, this is called reconciliation
mechanisms of information.
This paper presents a quantum protocol based on public-
private key cryptography for secure transmission of data
over a public channel. The security of the protocol de-
rives from the fact that Alice and Bob each use secret
keys in the multiple exchange of the qubit. Unlike the
BB84 protocol [1] and its many variants[2, 3], Bob knows
the key to transmit, the qubits are transmitted in only
one direction and classical information exchanged there-
after, the communication in the proposed protocol re-
mains quantum in each stage. In the BB84 protocol,
each transmitted qubit is in one of four different states,
in the proposed protocol, the transmitted qubit can be
in any arbitrary states.
II. PROTOCOL
• Alice took a bit i transforming it in to an element
of a secret base Bk genering the qubit |ψi,k〉, that
sends to Bob through a quantum channel .
• Bob applies Uj that is only known by him, to the
qubit |ψi,k〉, returns the resulting qubit to Alice .
• Alice measures the qubit in the base Bk obtaining
the bit j .
Where Bk = {|ψ0,k〉 , |ψ1,k〉},
i = |ψi,k〉 , |ψi,k〉 = αk |i〉+ (−)
iβk |1− i〉
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i⊕ (1 − i) = 1 , |αk|
2
+ |βk|
2
= 1
Initially, the qubit is in a pure state represented by
the operator density ρ = |ψi,k〉 〈ψi,k| [6] when the qubit
interacts whit the environment it becomes
ρ
′
=
∑
j
EjρE
†
j
Where Ej operators acting in the space of a qubit.
Therefore, Ej = σj0I + σj1X + σj2Z + σj3XZ satisfy all
conditions to
∑
j
E
†
jρEj = I
These operators transform the state of the qubit |ψi,k〉in
the overlap
|ψi,k〉 → Ej |ψi,k〉
representing bit-flip, phase-flip, or both [4, 5]
bit-flip X |ψi,k〉
X |ψi,k〉 = αk |1− i〉+ (−)
iβk |i〉
phase-flip Z |ψi,k〉
Z |ψi,k〉 = (−)
iαk |i〉 − βk |1− i〉
otherwise the error of both XZ |ψi,k〉 or ZX |ψi,k〉
XZ |ψi,k〉 = (−)
iαk |1− i〉 − βk |i〉
ZX |ψi,k〉 = (−)
1−iαk |1− i〉+ βk |i〉
give as measure 1− i equivalent to the measured qubit
|ψ1−i,k〉 in the base Bk.
Using this, Bob denotes operation U0 and U1 to the iden-
tity operator I and XZ operator, respectively, where the
bit j lis responsible for operation Uj
The bit j, which was chosen by Bob and transmitted
over a public channel, has reached Alice. Eve, the eaves-
dropper, cannot obtain any information by intercepting
the transmitted qubits, although she could disrupt the
exchange by replacing the transmitted qubits by her own.
This can be detected by:
• appending parity bits, and/or
2• appending previously chosen bit sequences, which
could be the destination and sending addresses or
their hashed values, or some other mutually agreed
sequence.
Since the Bk and Uj transformations can be changed
as frequently as one pleases, Eve cannot obtain any sta-
tistical clues to their nature by intercepting the qubits.
III. THREE PSEUDO-CODE THE PROTOCOL
The protocol is divided into three regions
I Preparation Phase (Alice)
II Preparation Phase Key-Message (Bob)
III Measurement and derivation phase (Alice)
Eva is not involved in step I, II, because the key-
message has not been built, it only concern to be in-
volved in step II, III. Three pseudo-codes are presented.
The first is the ideal case where there are no errors, the
second and third solve the quantum noise problem, gates
errors and intervention from an eavesdropper (Eve).
The phase of preparation is the same for all pseudo-
codes:
I Phase
• Alice creates a randomly tN bits, generating a
string a.
• Alice randomly chooses tN bases from the
{B1, B2, ..., Bn} generating a string b.
• FOR each bit ak in a codify ak in the base bk re-
sulting in the k-qubit.
• Alice send the generated qubits to Bob.
Pseudo-code 1
II Phase
• Bob builds a binary string m Key-Message tN bits
long.
• FOR each mk in m
– IF (mk = 1)
∗ Bob applies the gate to the XZ or ZX
k-qubit.
• Bob sends tN qubits to Alice.
III Phase
• Alice measures the k-qubit in the Bk base generat-
ing a string c.
• Alice sum c⊕a obtaining the stringm Key-Message
used by Bob.
Pseudo-code 2
II Phase
• Bob builds a binary string m Key-Message N bits
long.
• FOR each mk in m
– IF (mk = 1)
∗ Bob applies the gate to the XZ or ZX
from the (kt+ 1− t)-qubit to kt-qubit.
• Bob sends tN qubits to Alice.
III Phase
• Alice measures the k-qubit in the bk base generat-
ing a string c.
• Alice sum c ⊕ a obtaining the string M and build
the string ds = Mst+1−tMst+2−t, ,Mst with s =
{1, 2, ..., N} where the string M = d1, d2, , dN .
• FOR each string ds ofM will be generated a string
m
′
and p, N bits long as follows.
– IF (f(ds, i) > t), where f(ds, i) counts the bit
i at the ds string
∗ m
′
s = i y ps = 0
– ELSE
∗ ps = 1 y m
′
s = 0
• Alice send to Bob the string p.
• FOR each ps and some pk = 0 in p
– IF (ps = 1 )
∗ Alice m
′
k⊕m
′
s of m
′
generating the string
C key-message
∗ Bob mk ⊕ms of m generating the string
C key-message
Pseudo-code 3
II Phase
• Bob builds a binary string m Key-Message N bits
long.
• FOR each N-qubits
– FOR each mk in m
∗ IF (mk = 1)
· Bob applies the gate to theXZ or ZX
k-qubit.
• Bob sends tN qubits to Alice.
3III Phase
• Alice measures the k-qubit in the bk base generat-
ing a string c.
• Alice sum c ⊕ a obtaining the string M and build
the string ds = Mst+1−tMst+2−t, ,Mst with s =
{1, 2, ..., N} where the string M = d1, d2, , dN .
• Alice compares all the binary strings ds and re-
builds m.
IV. GENERALIZATION
Only Bob is involved in the preparation phase of Key-
Message this allows extended to three parties (Alice,
Bob, Celine) unlike the standard protocols [7].
I Preparation Phase (Alice,Celine)
II Preparation Phase Key-Message (Bob)
III Measurement and derivation phase (Alice, Celine)
• Alice took a bit i transforming it in to an element
of a secret base Bk, Celine took a bit i transforming
it in to an element of a secret base Bt, both sends
their qubit to Bob through a quantum channel.
• Bob applies Uj secret operation on the qubits |ψi,k〉
and |ψs,t〉 returns qubits resulting to their respec-
tive parties
• Alice and Celine measures the qubits in the base
Bk and Bt obtaining a value sent by Bob.
Generalizing the protocol for n parties, where Bob is
central, a quantum key-message distribution network will
be obtained.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The quantum protocol presented with its variants pro-
vides a safe sending of information of direct communica-
tion between two or more parties. The generalizations
for n parties can create a network of massive sending
information for n− 1 parties being one of them the key-
message distribution center. This protocol is used to dis-
tribute applications key-messages safe over long distances
because it allows the sending of massive qubits. Since the
proposed protocol does not use classical communication,
it is immune to the man-in-the-middle attack on the clas-
sical communication channel which BB84 type quantum
cryptography protocols suffers from [8]. On the other
hand, implementation of this protocol may be harder be-
cause the qubits get exchanged multiple times.
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